The volatility patterns of overnight interest rates differ across industrial countries in ways that existing models, designed to replicate the features of the U.S. federal funds market, cannot explain. This paper presents an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that matches these different patterns by incorporating differences in policy execution by the world's main central banks, including differences in central banks' management of marginal lending and deposit facilities in response to shocks. Our model is consistent with central banks' observed practice of rationing access to marginal facilities when the objective of stabilizing short-term interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as the targeting of exchange rates.
Introduction
The overnight market for unsecured interbank loans plays a key role in the financial structure of most industrial countries. It anchors the term structure of interest rates and serves as the channel through which monetary policy is executed and liquid funds are funneled to the nonbank sector. To make models tractable for term-structure analysis and asset-pricing, most models of this market have not allowed for an explicit role of monetary policy in determining short-term interest rates. In fact, the few studies that have taken into explicit account the role of central banks in the interbank market, have done so with the goal of replicating key features of individual markets (typically, the U.S. federal funds market). Cross-country evidence (see, for instance, BIS, 1997 , Ball and Torous, 1999 , however, points to patterns in interest rate behavior in the main industrial countries that call for a more unified framework than available from models tailored to fit individual money markets.
In this paper, after building on previous empirical studies to present more comprehensive evidence on cross-country patterns in short-term interest volatility, we develop an equilibrium model of the overnight interbank market that replicates these patterns. The main ingredient of our analysis is to allow for central banks' varying degree of accommodation of liquidity shocks, specifically: for varying degree of access by banks to o cial marginal liquiditymanagement facilities. This feature plays a central role in our analysis as it does in actual policy execution in the industrial world, whereby central banks routinely ration market participants' access to o cial lending and borrowing when the day-to-day goal of stabilizing interest rates conflicts with another high-frequency objective, such as an exchange rate target.
By incorporating this ingredient, our model provides a unified analytical framework that accounts for key similarities and di erences in overnight interest volatility patterns in the main industrial countries. Specifically, like previous models (see, for instance, Spindt and Ho meister, 1988, and Gri ths and Winters, 1995) , our model can replicate the observed cyclical behavior of interest rate volatility associated with periodic reserve requirements.
The model also accommodates the observed decline in interest rate volatility as market rates 1 approach rates on marginal o cial facilities, which is typical of the United States and other countries whose central banks are committed to stabilizing interest rates at high frequency.
Di erently from previous studies, however, our model can also reproduce an increase in volatility as market rates approach rates on marginal facilities, which is typical of countries where access to these facilities is rationed, for instance, because interest rate targeting is subordinated to exchange rate targeting. We show that this result is also consistent with evidence of rising interest volatility as a currency's exchange rate departs from its target level, when the central bank adheres to a recognizable exchange rate target.
Our work contributes to recent research on the equilibrium determination of short-term interest rates and on the micro-foundations of monetary policy execution. The standard reference for this research is Hamilton (1996) , whose model, however, allows only for banklevel uncertainty and deterministic interest rates. As most other models in the literature (for instance, Clouse and Dow, 1999 , and Hayashi, 2001 and, earlier, Ho and Saunders, 1985 , and Campbell, 1987 , Hamilton focuses only on the demand side of the money market, leaving no role for central bank intervention.
Models allowing for central bank intervention are o ered by Nautz (1998) , , and Valimaki (2003) . These models, however, are tailored to the specific features of German, U.S., and Euro Zone markets, respectively, and lack the flexibility needed to explain cross-country di erences in interest rate behavior. In particular, they assume that banks can borrow and lend funds freely at o cial marginal facilities. By contrast, our analysis shows that rationing of marginal borrowing and lending is crucial to capture the cross-country behavior of interest rate volatility.
More than other studies in this area, Farnsworth and Bass (2000) shares our concern with the e ects of partial commitment of central banks to stabilize short rates' behavior.
Farnsworth and Bass assume, as we do, a central bank to intervene to target very short rates only imperfectly. Aside from technical di erences, their model focuses on the dynamics of target rates, while our model focuses on higher-frequency dynamics of market rates for given targets, viewing the latter as determined, at lower frequency, by central banks' response to changes in inflation, employment, and other macro aggregates. Also, Farnsworth and Bass's interest in a model numerically tractable for bond pricing leads them to abstract from institutional features such as periodic reserve requirements and the distinction between marginal and intra-marginal liquidity provision. We include these details explicitly, and assign to central banks' willingness to provide funds in response to shocks a key role in shaping the behavior of the main industrial countries' interbank markets.
The Empirical Behavior of Overnight Interest Rates
Although our paper is mostly concerned with explaining the behavior of overnight interest rates in industrial countries, in this section we o er also a more comprehensive empirical account of this behavior than available in previous research. With few exceptions, previous studies of interest rates have focussed on individual-country data (typically, the United States; see Spindt and Ho meister, 1988 , Rudebusch, 1995 , Hamilton, 1996 , and Balduzzi et al., 1997 . This one-country/one-model approach is not well suited to analyze the behavior of interest rates across policy regimes, however. Model heterogeneity makes cross-country results essentially impossible to compare, a shortcoming that we tackle by first imposing on all our sample countries a common general specification and then adapting this specification to each sample following a standard model-search methodology.
One of the few studies examining cross-country di erences in interest rate behavior is Prati et al. (2002) . Our work here improves on that study in two main respects. First, we follow a formal general-to-specific model selection procedure, which is absent from that study and which allows us to provide more solid econometric evidence for our subsequent modeling e ort. Second, we link the volatility of interest rates to past levels of interest rates (as opposed to interest rate targets, which are rarely available and are often insu ciently variable to allow identifying their e ects on interest volatility). These changes increase the estimation e ort by an order of magnitude, given the computer-intensive nature of our nonlinear estimation. They lead, however, to a description of interest rate behavior that is both 3 more satisfactory and more coherent with the model that follows.
Another study with an international focus is Ball and Torous (1999) which, however, analyzes one-month interbank rates, without controlling for reserve requirements, interest rate corridors, and other institutional features of the interbank market. Despite di erences in data and focus, this and other studies (including Brenner et al., 1996, and Andersen and Lund, 1997) document properties of short rates such as fat tails, GARCH e ects, and dependence of volatility on interest rate levels, which we must incorporate in our empirical model to provide an accurate characterization of interest rate behavior.
Empirical Model
To study the main high-frequency patterns in overnight interest rate volatility in the seven largest industrial countries and the integrated Euro Zone, we follow Hamilton (1996) and select a model that nests the benchmark "martingale" hypothesis for overnight rates into a more general model that allows for predictable day-to-day rate changes.
1 Specifically, our model allows for e ects of reserve requirements and calendar time on both mean and volatility of interest rates, for fat-tailed and asymmetric distribution of errors, and for GARCH e ects and dependence of volatility on the rate's level (measured, as explained below, as the position of the market rate within a corridor defined by rates on o cial borrowing/deposit facilities).
We specify the dynamics of the overnight rate as
where is a mean-zero, unit-variance i.i.d. error term; is the conditional mean of ;
and is the conditional Exponential GARCH (EGARCH) volatility parameter. As we now explain, the evolution of and 2 is governed by Equations (2) and (3) below.
1 The "martingale hypothesis" rests on the role of periodic reserve requirements in determining the timeseries behavior of mean overnight rates. According to this hypothesis, these rates should not display predictable daily changes within each reserve-averaging period, otherwise banks could profit by selling reserves on "high" rate days and buying them on "low" rate days, while still satisfying reserve requirements.
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To model and , we first control for calendar e ects by including fixed-e ect dummies and in the mean and variance equations, respectively, for each weekday and for holidays, end-months, end-quarters, end-years, and the days before and after them.
Next we incorporate di erences in reserve requirements in our eight samples, requiring banks to maintain minimum average reserve balances over reserve periods lasting as long as one month in Japan, Germany, the Euro Zone, France, and Italy, or as short as one day One of the main goals of our work is to study the high-frequency impact on interest volatility of central banks' liquidity-management procedures. Liquidity provision by central banks usually involves intra-marginal draining and injection of funds through repo operations at a key policy (or "target") rate , often combined with marginal draining and injection of funds at and , the "floor" and "ceiling," respectively, of corridors for market rates around target, with . To study the volatility impact of these arrangements, we first control for level-shift e ects of changes in o cial rates by including series of changes in floor, target, and ceiling rates, = {( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )}, as determinants of mean rates. We also include in the variance equation a set of constant terms to control for unusual volatility on days when floor, target, and ceiling rates change (that is, on days when the corresponding term in is not zero). More important, we include as a determinant of 2 the (centered) position of the overnight rate in its fluctuation corridor,
(Corridor rates are defined for each country in Appendix A.)
Finally, for countries explicitly targeting exchange rates, we include in the variance equa-2 Our results are essentially unchanged if is defined using lagged corridor rates in stead of contemporaneous rates, as in =
. This robustness is intuitive, since the two definitions di er only over the few days when corridor rates change. We present results with defined as in the text, since this is more consistent with the presumed dependence of the conditional volatility of on its corridor at .
5 tion a variable measuring the position of the exchange rate in its own target corridor.
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This variable proxies for circumstances in which a central bank may be reluctant to o set inflows or outflows of liquidity from the interbank market. Our particular proxy is motivated by the fact that central banks targeting exchange rates typically ration interbank liquidity in periods of exchange rate pressure to discourage flows of funds from (occasionally into) the domestic financial sector. This conflict at high frequency between interest rate targeting and another (possibly overriding) target may lead to greater interest rate volatility.
The resulting equations for the mean and the variance of overnight rates are
where is the autoregressive EGARCH coe cient, L is the lag operator, and we allow for asymmetric response of log ( 2 ) to positive and negative shocks when 6 = 0. In (3), both and are included as squared deviations of interest and exchange rates from their mid-corridor levels, since the testable hypothesis is that interest volatility should rise when interest and exchange rates approach either of their corridors' margins.
Since banks' ability to arbitrage over cross-period interest rate gaps by carrying reserve imbalances over to the next reserve period is restricted, 4 a di erent model should be used to describe the behavior of overnight rates on the first day of each reserve period. To this end, we follow Hamilton (1996) by including a more general auto-regressive term in the equation of the mean when =1. In particular, we include changes in in the previous five days, that is, the term P 5
=1
( 1 ). For the first day of each period, we also include a constant in the variance equation and, for countries publishing an explicit interest rate target, the di erence between the overnight rate on the last day of the maintenance period and the target rate on the first day, Figure 1 plots the overnight market rate and marginal rate series used in the empirical analysis documented in detail in Appendix A. We discuss here in detail the results most relevant for the theoretical analysis that follows, namely, those pertaining to the link between interest rate volatility and monetary policy execution frameworks. The remaining results, concerning estimated mean coe cients and statistical properties of the error terms, are reviewed in Appendix A.
Results
A first set of results from our multi-country analysis matches earlier findings for U.S. data (Spindt and Ho meister, 1988; Hamilton, 1996; Bartolini et al., 2002) . In all countries relying on periodic reserve requirements to stabilize interbank rates (that is, in all our sample countries except Canada and the United Kingdom), settlement-day rates are significantly more volatile than non-settlement-day rates. This finding, formally documented in Table A1 , is clearly apparent in Figure 2 , which plots estimates of reserve-period e ects on volatility (the coe cients in (3)) for all our countries except the United Kingdom.
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In addition, higher settlement-day volatility tends to propagate to the days immediately preceding settlement: the last seven days of the reserve period in Germany, the last five days in the Euro Zone, the last four days in Italy, the last three days in the United States, and the last two days in Japan display interest volatility higher than the average of the previous days in the period. for the first four countries, but as significantly positive for the latter four.
We propose the following interpretation of this finding. Monetary policy is executed in essentially di erent ways in our large and small countries. Central banks in the latter group of countries tend to ration the provision of liquid funds in response to shocks, especially at marginal facilities, a practice that causes interest rates to respond more strongly to shocks as they depart from their target level. The opposite is true for our large countries.
The main reason for this di erence is that in our four large countries, the operational goal of monetary policy -to stabilize very short interest rates -does not conflict with other high-frequency objectives: The day-to-day goal of the central bank is to keep interbank rates near target (which itself stays constant until new information accrues, at lower frequency, on the evolution of macro aggregates such as inflation and unemployment). This policy truncates further movements of market rates as they sway away from target, causing them to become less responsive to shocks as they approach the corridor's margins. This pattern results in a negative coe cient for the squared position of the interest rate in its corridor, for the United States, the Euro Zone, Japan, and Germany.
Monetary policy operates very di erently when interest rate stabilization is subordinated to an alternative high-frequency objective. Such is typically the case with central banks of small, open economies, whose operational goals often include stabilizing the exchange rate.
In these countries, deviations of interest rates from target correlate with outflows of funds from the domestic banking sector that pull the exchange rate away from its own target.
To stem such flows, central banks ration access to marginal liquidity, curb intra-marginal intervention, and occasionally adjust target rates. These rationing strategies cause interest rates to become more responsive to shocks as they depart from target. This is the essence of so-called interest rate defenses of exchange rates (see Drazen, 2001 , for a review), which are picked up in Table 1 by positive estimates for for the textbook cases of Italy and France, and -to a lesser extent -Canada. 8 In fact, as our later model shows, a U-shaped link between the interest rate's position in its corridor and interest volatility should be expected whenever marginal liquidity provision is rationed, irrespective of a central bank's motives for doing so, as exemplified by the case of the Bank of England.
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The final set of results that we discuss here relates to another dimension along which a central bank's commitment to stabilize interest rates a ects interest volatility. As noted above, we included in the variance equation the (squared) distance of the exchange rate from its target for countries linked in an explicit exchange rate arrangement (Germany, France, Italy until 1992 and after 1996, and the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1992). Our conjecture is that, for these countries, overnight rates' volatility should be higher in periods with stronger "exchange rate pressure" (irrespective of the shape of the link between volatility and the rate's position in its corridor), because at these times a central bank may be more reluctant to provide funds to banks in response to shocks.
Indeed, we find strong evidence that in countries explicitly targeting exchange rates, overnight interest rates were more volatile during periods in which the exchange rate was further away from target than at other times: the coe cient linking interest volatility to the squared ERM divergence indicator was precisely estimated with a positive sign in Germany, France, and Italy (see Table 1 ); it was also positive, though statistically insignificant, in the U.K. sample, which included only a short ERM period. Explaining these results, along with our findings on the cyclical behavior of interest volatility and on volatility patterns over interest rate corridors, is on the agenda for the next sections.
3 Interbank Markets with Central Bank Intervention
The Model
We now present an equilibrium model of an interbank market that captures the stylized facts documented above. The model is stylized, and simplifies the operation of the interbank market in two main ways. First, it abstracts from cross-bank heterogeneity, including in size and exposure to shocks, that has played a role in previous studies of interbank markets (see, for instance, Allen and Saunders, 1986, and Hamilton, 1996) . This simplification allows us to apply a representative-agent solution method that greatly simplifies the analysis. Second, the model assumes a hybrid trading environment that captures the main common features of our eight sample markets, leaving two parameters measuring the commitment of the central bank to interest rate stabilization as the main degrees of freedom to capture cross-country di erences in central bank behavior.
We consider a market populated by competitive, identical, risk-neutral banks, whose stocks of liquid funds ("reserves") are exposed to common shocks. We study this market's equilibrium over a reserve period lasting days. We denote aggregate bank reserves at the end of day by and cumulative holdings of reserves since the beginning of the period by 1 + + . Banks' reserves are subject to the end-period requirement . (We consider the case of an additional daily requirement , which is superfluous for our main results, in Section 4.)
Each day = 1 , the sequence of events is as follows.
At the beginning of the day (at 9:00 a.m., say), the central bank intervenes by injecting a net amount of reserves into the banking sector ( 0 for a reserve drain). The central bank chooses to keep the equilibrium interbank overnight rate for day , expected as of its "a.m." intervention time, E [ ], as close as possible to the target , choosing from
Thus, parameterizes the central bank's commitment to through intra-marginal intervention: the higher is , the stronger is the adherence to the target.
At 10:00 a.m., a random shock to reserves , with cumulative distribution ( ), mean , and variance 2 , reaches banks from the nonbank sector.
At 12:00 p.m. the interbank market opens, allowing banks to trade reserves through unsecured overnight loans at the rate .
At 3:00 p.m., after the market has cleared, a second random shock to reserves is realized, with cumulative distribution ( ), mean , and variance 2 .
10 At day's close, banks' daily reserves are computed and added to the cumulative balance for the period, .
This routine is repeated each day = 1 . At the end of (settlement) day , cumulative reserves are assessed against required reserves , and banks can access rationed "marginal" borrowing and deposit facilities: they must fill reserve deficiencies by borrowing up to from the central bank at the ceiling rate , and can dispose of excess reserves by depositing up to at the floor rate . Excess reserves beyond are worthless; reserve deficiencies in excess of can be filled only at a much higher cost . 11 Thus, parameterizes the central bank's commitment to the corridor [ , ] (with ) through marginal provision/drain of liquidity: the higher is , the stronger is the adherence to the corridor.
Market equilibrium on settlement day
Our assumption of identical, competitive banks allows us to study the market's equilibrium as it results from the behavior of a single representative bank, which competitively takes the rate as given. To study this equilibrium, we proceed backward from settlement day, , to day 1 of the reserve period.
Denote by e the representative bank's cumulative reserve position at the opening of the market on day . That is, e = 1 + + equals the cumulative reserve balance inherited from day 1, 1 , plus the reserve flows and recorded earlier in day .
Given and e , the representative bank chooses how much to borrow in the interbank market, , to maximize the profits generated by its overnight interbank position, net of penalties and returns associated with borrowing and lending funds from and to the central bank at day's end. That is, its problem is to maximize over :
Equation (4) sums the representative bank's costs and returns over each possible realization of e + + , the bank's end-period reserve balance, relative to the required level . Specifically, the first term in (4) measures the expected cost (at the rate ) of a reserve deficiency e . The second term in (4) adds the cost of incurring a deficiency larger than , since only up to can be borrowed from the central bank at , while additional deficiencies cost ( ) per unit. The third term in (4) measures the return, at the rate , to depositing funds in amount up to at the central bank. The fourth term in (4) adds the fixed (per unit) amount earned when excess reserves exceed . Finally, (4) includes the cost of borrowing in the interbank market at the rate .
The first-order condition for (4) yields the representative bank's optimal borrowing, :
Setting = 0, since the market must clear with no net borrowing or lending, Result 1. The market-clearing rate on settlement day is
a continuous, decreasing function (e ) of e .
Intuitively, equals a weighted average of , , and (and zero); rises with , , and ; and it falls with the representative bank's reserve position at market opening, e .
Consider next the central bank's problem of deciding, on the morning of day , how much liquidity to inject into (or drain from) the market, to bring the expected rate for day as close as possible to the target rate . solves
where the expectation is taken over , since it is conditional on information available to the central bank at its 9:00 a.m. intervention time. In (7), is the amount of intervention that equalizes to the rate expected for day , while the operator min{ max{ }} truncates to the interval [ ]. Equation (7) yields ( 1 ) as an implicit function of 1 , with the following properties (proof is in Appendix B):
Result 2. There is a unique solution ( 1 ), continuous and non-increasing in 1 .
Market equilibrium on non-settlement days
For a generic day , the representative bank's problem is
where +1 is the continuation value function, with terminal value given by its value for settlement day; and the expectation E [ ] is taken, conditionally on information available at market opening on day , over (the shock realized after market closing on day ) and +1
(the shock realized before market opening on day + 1). The expectation also incorporates the known central bank's intervention policy at + 1, +1 ( ).
14 The first-order condition for this standard dynamic programming problem is that the derivative with respect to of the single-period payo at , , should equal the expected, discounted derivative with respect to +1 of the single-period payo at + 1, +1 +1 :
Intuitively, (9) expresses the condition that a bank should not expect to profit by borrowing one more dollar in the interbank market at and one less dollar at + 1. From this condition, we obtain the following result (proof is in Appendix B):
Result 3. There is a unique solution (e ), continuous and decreasing in e .
Stepping back to the morning of day , the central bank's problem is, as in day ,
( 1 0 ) Equation (10) defines the intervention policy as a function ( 1 ) of cumulative reserves at the end of day 1. For day , the analog of Result 2 also holds (with proof identical to that of Result 2, except for a change in time subscripts from to ):
Result 4. There is a unique solution ( 1 ), continuous and non-increasing in 1 .
The Behavior of Interest Rate Volatility
Results 1-4 show that the model exhibits a single daily equilibrium for the market rate and the intervention policy , as a function of the state variables e and . In general, it is di cult to advance analytically beyond these results, since ( 1 ) is defined by (10) only in implicit form. Complete analytic solutions are available in limiting cases, such as when = or = 0, but are of limited practical interest.
Given Results 1-4, however, it is legitimate to seek the model's unique solutions by numerical methods. We do this using a standard backward-recursive grid method (details are corridor.) Our purpose is to illustrate the economic forces at work on average over our eight sample markets, more than to capture accurately the reality of any single market.
The demand for overnight funds. The first notable property of the curves (e ) is their negative slope, which conforms with Results 1 and 3 and reflects the lower likelihood of penalties on reserve overdrafts associated with higher values of e . (e ) also becomes flatter as goes from settlement day, = 5, to day 1. Formally, this feature reflects the iterative application of the expectation operator in (9): at each step = 1 1, Jensen's inequality makes E [ +1 ] smoother than +1 .
The economic intuition, discussed in Section 2.2, is that shocks to liquidity occurring early 12 With these parameters, the interest corridor of 2 percent is in line with those prevailing in several industrial countries; , which parameterizes the ratio of relevant information available daily to the central bank, is set at 1 4, in line with the case of a central bank intervening daily around mid-morning;
= 1, in turn, yields the case of a central bank that o sets by intra-marginal intervention about 3 4 of the shocks experienced by banks over a typical reserve period.
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in the period (plotted as movements on the horizontal axis of Figure 3 ) provide only a very imprecise signal of banks' likely end-period penalties on reserve deficiencies. Hence, they cause only a small response in rates, that is, curves that are flatter for early days of the period than for late days.
Another property displayed in Figure 3 is the inflection of the curves (e ) around the target (here set at 0 05). This inflection illustrates the stabilizing role of intra-marginal intervention, which partly o sets the exogenous shocks and . This o set is relatively more complete the smaller are the shocks, that is, the smaller is the departure of from .
By contrast, larger shocks are more likely to push the central bank against the limit that parameterizes its commitment to . Hence, they cause a proportionally stronger response in rates, that is, curves that initially steepen as moves away from .
The behavior of (e ) at the corridor's margins, and , illustrates the role of marginal Volatility over and across reserve periods. The previous properties can be mapped into predictions matching the empirical results of Section 2.
We begin by plotting in Figure 4 the conditional volatility of interest rates (the standard deviation of 1 ) over a typical reserve period for various values of . In accord with Figure 3 , it is intuitive that steepening interest rate curves as should cause volatility to rise over the period. This is indeed the case, as shown in Figure 4 for all values of . This prediction is consistent with evidence of cyclical volatility behavior provided, for the United States, by Spindt and Ho meister (1988) , Gri th and Winters (1995) , and Bartolini et al. (2002) and others, and -for other industrial countries -in Section 2 above.
Figure 4 also shows that volatility falls in reserve periods when banks can borrow and deposit more funds at the marginal facilities (that is, when is higher): flatter interest curves within the corridor and reduced scope for rates to sway outside the corridor dampen volatility over the whole reserve period. This prediction also parallels our results in Section 2. There, we used a measure of the exchange rate's distance from its target to proxy for a specific cause for a central bank's reluctance to provide funds in response to shocks. The model shows this prediction to be more general: whenever a central bank is reluctant to drain or inject funds at its marginal facilities in response to shocks, and irrespective of its motives for doing so, very short rates' volatility should rise.
Volatility over the corridor. Clearly, these patterns reflect the curvature properties of (e ) in Figure 3 . In particular, the asymptotic behavior of (e ) around and for high causes volatility to fall to zero as approaches and : near the corridor's margins, shocks to liquidity are almost-fully absorbed at the marginal facilities if is high, causing a negligible response in interest rates.
Conversely, the "fanning" behavior of (e ) through and for low causes volatility to rise as approaches these rates: given a limit on funds tradable at the facilities, the larger are the shock to banks' liquidity, the stronger is -proportionally -the response of market rates. This split prediction parallels our finding of a qualitatively di erent behavior of volatility in markets where the central bank is committed to interest rate stability at high frequency, and markets where the central bank -for any reason -rations banks' access to marginal facilities, for instance, because interest rate stability conflicts with an alternative, high-frequency objective (such as for the exchange rate).
Intra-marginal intervention and volatility. Finally, how does interest volatility behave for di erent central bank commitment to the target by intra-marginal intervention, here parameterized by ? Our benchmark is given by Figures 3-5 , which illustrate the model's predictions when 0 . What happens when falls to zero, or rises to infinity? When = 0, the central bank does not intervene at all intra-marginally at : the task of keeping rates within a corridor around is assigned solely to marginal provision of liquidity at and . In this case -we omit details for brevity -the model yields interest rate curves that look very similar to those of Figure 3 , except for their lack of inflection around . This lack of inflection, which reflects the lack of any interest stabilization at , causes interest rate volatility to display always an inverted U-shaped pattern over the corridor, since the curves (e ) are steepest in the middle of the corridor and flatter near the corridor's margins. Yet, aside from its analytical properties, the case = 0 is utterly unrealistic. Intra-marginal intervention is the chief means of stabilizing interest rates in industrial countries. If anything, the opposite case of = is closer to reality. When = , the central bank provides funds infinitely elastically at . From (9) and (10), then, = for all days before settlement: Banks have no incentive to trade among themselves at rates other than , if they can count on the central bank to o set all imbalances -and secure funds at the expected rate -until the morning of settlement day. Hence, there is no interest rate volatility for all . Only on settlement day is bid away from and its volatility becomes positive. Thus, in contrast with the standard reference in the literature (Spindt and Ho meister, 1998) , a pattern of gradually rising volatility such as the one displayed in Figure 4 and those estimated in Section 2, is not a necessary o spring of average reserve requirements. For volatility to propagate from settlement to pre-settlement days, a central bank should not be expected to intervene, in defense of a known target, to eliminate all risk of aggregate liquidity imbalances.
High-Frequency Liquidity E ects
Recent research (including Furfine, 2000 , Pérez Quirós and Rodríguez Mendizábal, 2000 , and Clouse and Dow, 2002 has suggested that restrictions on banks' ability to allocate reserve holdings across days may help explain patterns in means and volatilities of overnight rates such as the prevalence of high and volatile rates on settlement days, Mondays, and other calendar days. In particular, these studies suggest that penalties on low daily reserve balances -normally imposed on banks -contribute to predictable patterns in mean overnight rates by limiting banks' ability to shift holdings of reserves between days.
To incorporate these e ects in our model, assume that banks ending a day with reserves less than face a cost per unit of overdraft , in addition to the penalty on end-period cumulative overdrafts considered in our basic model.
In this case, when trading in the interbank market, a bank must forecast the e ect of its decisions on both end-day and end-period balances. As in Section 3, at the equilibrium rate , a bank should expect no gain from borrowing one dollar less on day and one additional dollar on day + 1 than on the equilibrium path. On day this perturbation would yield lower borrowing costs by , but also an additional expected penalty ( ) on end-day overdrafts. On day + 1, the same perturbation would yield additional (expected)
borrowing costs E [ +1 ], but also a decline in (expected) end-day penalties by R ( +1 )d ( ). Setting total expected profits at zero,
Equation (11) . By contrast, in our previous model, =
at all times, as and
depend only on projected cumulative end-period balances.
Second, days with greater variance of shocks should display higher mean rates, since they are associated with a higher probability of end-day overdrafts. For instance, if we allow the distributions and +1 to di er, and substitute ( ) with a mean-preserving spread e ( ), then, everything else constant, the probability e ( +1 +1 ) of a daily balance in the lower tail of the distribution rises, for low values of . Days with greater volatility of shocks will then exhibit rates that are both higher (
) and more volatile.
How consistent are these predictions with the behavior of very short-term rates in industrial countries' interbank markets?
The first prediction finds considerable support in several studies of high-frequency liquidity e ects of monetary policy, including Hamilton (1997) for the United States, Hayashi (2001) for Japan, and Angeloni and Bisagni (2002) for the Euro Zone. These studies document that, in violation of the martingale hypothesis and in accord with the view that reserves are non-substitutable for banks between days of the same reserve period, monetary policy can drive predictable wedges in overnight rates across any two days.
The second prediction is fairly consistent with U.S. data, which display a clear correlation of means and volatilities of overnight rates for each reserve period (see Tables A1-A2, and the extended discussion in Furfine, 2000) and for other calendar days. In particular, high and volatile rates tend to cluster on settlement and end-quarter days. However, non-U.S. markets provide little support for the same prediction: our estimates show almost no sign correlation between mean and variance coe cients. For instance, while settlement days display pervasively high interest volatility, they display above-average mean rates only in the United States and Germany. Along the workweek, the only highest-volatility day that is also the highest-mean day is Thursday in the United Kingdom; in no market is the lowestvolatility day also the lowest-mean day. There is some correlation in sign between mean and variance coe cients at end-months, end-quarters, and end-years: in 12 instances where both mean and volatility coe cients were statistically significant (out of 24 possible instances), 11 agreed in sign, showing both higher mean and volatility. On the other hand, we found mean and variance coe cients for days before and after holidays to be either insignificant or to display no correlation in sign. Altogether, this evidence suggests that introducing penalties on daily liquidity overdrafts or other frictions on banks' ability to shift reserve holdings across days contributes (at best) marginally to explaining overnight interest rate behavior in the world's largest money markets.
Conclusions
A simple model of an interbank market in which a central bank intervenes -with limited commitment -to stabilize interest rates around a target, can replicate the main qualitative properties of money market rates' volatility in the world's largest interbank markets. These properties include a tendency for interest rate volatility to behave cyclically in countries with reserve averaging, a tendency for volatility to rise in periods when a central bank is less likely to accommodate shocks to banks' liquidity, and -most interesting -a non-linear response of volatility to movements of market rates within o cial interest rate corridors.
To replicate these properties, our model relies only on parameterized di erences in central banks' commitment to interest rate smoothing at high frequency, pointing to this aspect of monetary policy execution as a key factor shaping the behavior of money markets and short-term interest rates around the world.
Our agenda for further research is topped by two items. First, allowing for heterogeneity in banks' behavior and exposure to shocks should be useful to capture features of the interbank trading environment that our representative-agent model with instantaneous trading is not designed to emulate. Chief among these features are a tendency for small banks to 22 be lenders and large banks to be borrowers in the market, and the sharp changes in interest volatility observed in intra-day data (including a systematic rise in volatility at day's end).
A second goal should be to incorporate the high-frequency, institution-driven perspective of our and of related studies, into a framework more suitable for asset pricing. At this stage, our contribution should be seen as complementary to that of studies such as Piazzesi (2001) and Farnsworth and Bass (2002) , whose focus on asset pricing accompanies a much more stylized description of banks' trading environment than that provided by our study. A first step for future research bridging these two perspectives would be to parameterize the nonlinearities in interest rate behavior that we document and explain here, use them to augment otherwise-standard pricing models, and see if this improves the empirical performance of the model against short-term bond price data. We defined ceilings and floors of interest rate corridors in accord with definitions provided in BIS (1997) and individual central banks' publications. We used rates on standing facilities as ceiling rates for the Euro Zone, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada, and as floor rates for the Euro Zone and Canada. We used, as ceiling rates, penalty rates on end-period reserve overdrafts for the United States and pre-1995 Japan, and the discount rate -which has been used as a cap for market rates since March 1995 -for Japan in more recent years; and, for floor rates, we used the compensatory rate on end-period excess reserves for Italy, the o cial reverse-repo rate for France, and the discount rate for Germany.
For countries lacking facilities aimed at keeping rates above zero -the United States, Japan, and the United Kingdom -we set the floor rate at zero.
13
13 The German and Japanese discount windows operated very di erently. Since 1995, Japan's discount Estimation. We assumed the error terms to be distributed as Student-t variables, and estimated the model by maximum likelihood, using numerical optimization.
14 We estimated our model independently for each country. To a large extent, this was the only possible choice, since most of our samples did not overlap in time. 15 Another problem, however, was that our non-linear, highly-parameterized model was computationally very intensive to estimate, requiring more than a day per regression, for some of our samples, on a standard desktop computer. Convergence and identification of global maximum likelihood certainly would have been a problem in simultaneous estimation.
For each sample, we followed a general-to-specific search to obtain our final specification.
We started by estimating a model encompassing all variables in (2) and (3). We then dropped the least significant variables (in groups of three or four at a time) and re-estimated the model, iteratively, until we obtained specifications with all parameters significant at least at the 0.10 percent level, with the following exceptions to this rule. First, we retained the full set of reserve-period coe cients in the mean equation if the coe cients were jointly significant. We did the same for the coe cients in the variance equation and for the five week-day coe cients in both the mean and variance equations. We also retained all rate has been set at a penalty, thus e ectively capping market rates. The German window, instead, was a rationed, below-market facility, providing a floor to market rates, as banks could repay outstanding loans before lending in the market at below-discount rates. Until January 2003, the U.S. discount rate was also set below market. However (see Peristiani, 1998) , borrowing banks incurred additional non-pecuniary costs, including special Fed scrutiny, limits on further loans, and the cost of revealing financial weakness by being supported by the Fed. These costs suggest that U.S. market rates could be capped at a level equal to the discount rate plus non-pecuniary costs of discount borrowing. However, we preferred to use the penalty rate on reserve deficiencies as a ceiling for U.S. rates, since this is a readily available measure, while non-pecuniary costs of discount borrowing are di cult to estimate and are both bank-specific and time-varying.
14 As in Andersen and Lund (1997) , we smoothed the function | | at the origin by using, for | | 2 , the twice-di erentiable approximation | | = 2 cos( ) , with set at 20.
15 Notably, the Euro Zone sample was wholly disjoint from those of Germany, France, and Italy. However, because we used for each country the longest, most recent sample of institutionally homogeneous data, problems of non-overlapping samples were pervasive.
the EGARCH parameters in our final specification, even when, for instance, the asymmetric response parameter was not statistically significant.
To select the autoregressive EGARCH structure, we analyzed sample-by-sample the correlogram of squared standardized residuals. The result was an EGARCH(1,1) model for all countries except the United Kingdom, which required an EGARCH(2,2). Standard tests revealed insignificant coe cients for higher lags and no residual conditional heteroskedasticity.
We generally avoided testing for structural breaks in the coe cients, since the large number of observations would have led us to accept almost any break. Again, we made one exception to this rule. For France, even casual visual inspection of the data revealed a dramatic decline in volatility beginning in May 1992. At this time, the Banque de France had modified its operating procedures by intervening much more aggressively to reduce interest volatility and by clearly indicating to market participants its plan to provide funds at a stable repo rate. Accordingly, we introduced a constant shift dummy in the level of the variance as of May 1992 and allowed the EGARCH parameters to break at this time.
Technical results. We briefly review the results not discussed in the text. These are reported in Tables A1-A5 which, along with Table 1 , completely document our estimation.
We found fixed e ects on mean interest rates (the coe cients and in (2); see Table A2 -A3) to be erratic in sign and significance across countries. The only fairly robust cross-country pattern in mean rates was the tendency for rates to rise at end-quarters (Table   A3 ), a feature likely to reflect, in part, window-dressing e ects previously recognized in U.S.
data. 16 Week-day and holiday-related patterns in volatility (the coe cients in Table A4) also proved rather non-robust across countries, except for greater end-quarter and end-year volatility in most samples, and greater volatility in the first day of each reserve period.
Changes in o cial rates had generally predictable e ects on market rates (Table A5) .
Target, floor, and ceiling rate changes, in particular, were positively correlated with changes in market rates, with coe cients all ranging between zero and one. In countries for which we had access to interest rate targets, we found most end-period gaps of market rates from target rates to disappear in the first day of the following period.
Estimated features of the error terms were qualitatively similar to those documented by Ball and Torous (1999) for one-month rates. In particular, we found pervasive GARCH e ects, with evidence of persistent volatility: the coe cients and in Table A4 are everywhere strongly significant. We also found the error terms to display clear fat tails, with degrees of freedom of the t-distribution estimated mostly between 2 and 4. Finally, we found some evidence of asymmetric e ects of positive and negative shocks to rates (the coe cient is significant in five of the eight regressions).
Appendix B. Proofs of Results 2 and 3
Proof of Result 2: Since, by Result 1, (e ) is continuous and decreasing in e , and are day-specific functions of parameters only.)
Therefore, E [ | ( 1 )] is everywhere non-increasing in 1 , and strictly decreasing over non-degenerate intervals. The same remark applies by replacing everywhere with .
Proof of Result 3:
The proof is by recursion: We assume Result 3 to hold at + 1, and show that it also holds at . The recursion is completed by observing that, by Result 1, Result 3 holds at .
To establish uniqueness we only need to observe that the quadratic equation (9) To establish the monotonicity of (e ), then, we only need to establish that E [ +1 ] is strictly decreasing in e +1 . But this follows from To solve our model numerically, we begin by defining grids for the state variables and e , = 1 , and a discrete approximation for the normal distributions of and .
We then start with the analytical solution for (e ) in (6) to solve for ( 1 ). To this end, for each node on the grid for 1 , we obtain ( 1 ) by computing the expectation (7) over the possible realizations of , given the known values of (e ).
Whenever simulated realizations of (and, later, of ), added to 1 , yield a value of e not on the grid's nodes (which happens with probability one), the appropriate value of (e ) is linearly interpolated from the adjacent nodes.
Stepping back to day 1, we solve for 1 (e 1 ) for each node on the grid for e 1 , by computing the expectation 1 [ (e )] in (9) over the possible realizations of 1 and , given the known values of (e ). To calculate = e 1 + 1 + + we also include, for each realization of 1 = e 1 + 1 , the value of ( 1 ) obtained above.
We then step back to the morning of 1 to solve for 1 ( 2 ), then to the afternoon of 2 to solve for 2 (e 2 ), and so on, for = 3 2 1. This yields a complete family of solutions for the vectors 1 (e 1 ) (e ).
This solution can be used to compute volatility statistics by Montecarlo. In the examples discussed in the text, we simulated 50,000 reserve periods by drawing 50,000 sequences { } and { }, each including i.i.d., normally-distributed values of and , and simulating the resulting sequences of { (e )}. Importantly, since the solution method does not su er from curse of dimensionality (the solution's time rises linearly with both and the precision of the grids), the grids for and e can be chosen -essentially -as fine as desired. (We chose grids for and e mapping into grids for with steps no larger than 1 basis point.) 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 U.K. Conditional volatility of overnight rates over the reserve period 
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